Sunday, December 24, 2017

Canada Securities Regulators No Longer Require Insider Trade Summary Reports

Well, this was not on the horizon of many investors' and quite unexpected. Effective March 1, 2018 TMXMoney will no longer provide Insider Trade Summaries.

Back in September 8, 2006, before I truly started investing, this Insider Trade Summary Report was enacted for end-of-day information. This trade information would only show if it was on an official exchange and not if, for example, the transaction was via Private Placement or an Alternate Exchange. The TMX site allowed you to input a symbol to find out whether a trade was completed or through a snapshot of the Top 10 Buys or Sells by Volume or Value.

On the Retail level (ie. regular investors like myself) we might not have looked at this information. If we did, the end-of-day TMX Insider Trade Summary was likely the fastest method. Perhaps if we wanted to dig deeper there is SEDI (www.sedi.ca, implemented June 9, 2003 - http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/19854.htm), but that is not as convenient for a quick snapshot.

Why would we Retail investors use it? In itself it really doesn't tell us much aside that someone within the company may be purchasing or selling a large amount of stock. We might be able to infer a level of confidence by Insiders in their company. The usefulness is also reduced because it is for end-of-day and does not provide historical or specific Insider seller information.

When you go to the TMX Insider Trade Summary site (https://app.tmxmoney.com/research/insidertradesummaries?locale=EN) a message shows:


Clicking the "View Notice" link brings you to the December 1, 2017 release (https://www.tmxmoney.com/en/pdf/insider_trade_notice.pdf) states:

"December 1 2017

TSX, TSXV and ALPHA would like to announce that the securities regulators have approved our request to revoke orders imposed on TSX, TSXV and ALPHA that require the public dissemination of insider trading marker summary reports (“Insider Trade Marker Report”) on an end of day basis (“Regulatory Orders”).

TSX, TSXV and ALPHA will cease publication of the Insider Trade Marker Report & Insider Trader Marker Corrections files effective Mar 1, 2018 in order to respect the 90-day notification period applicable to this data product.

The decision to seek revocation of the Regulatory Orders was the result of a public comment process
spearheaded by TSX, TSXV and ALPHA in response to client feedback. TSX, TSXV and ALPHA published the Request for Comments [https://www.tsx.com/trading/toronto-stock-exchange/trading-rules-and-regulations/other-requests-for-comments] to broadly consult on the relevance and usefulness of the Insider Trade Marker Report. This resulted in seven comment letters that were substantively aligned in the view that these reports are detrimental to large security holders because the published information can be used to disadvantage investors when acquiring or disposing of a large position.

TSX, TSXV and ALPHA thank all participants for their participation in this process. The discontinuation of the Insider Trade Marker Report was a joint industry effort and TSX, TSXV and ALPHA are proud to have helped facilitate this.

For more information, please contact the datasales@tmx.com"

The article links to this page "Other Requests for Comments" (https://www.tsx.com/trading/toronto-stock-exchange/trading-rules-and-regulations/other-requests-for-comments), which provides a summary of the process and the updates relating to the discontinuation of the Insider Trading Summary Report.

Reading the material it seems the 8 commenters provided feedback essentially stating the Summary Report no longer supports the initial purpose of levelling the playing field; as short term traders can utilize the information for short term gains. They claim is large security holders have been materially impacted as they cannot sell or buy large positions without detection by these short term traders thereby creating a disincentive for them. In fact they say it may push them to move trades to the US Markets.

You can read more of their reasoning here on the "Summary of Comments": https://www.tsx.com/resource/en/1519

Perhaps for large institutional investors this Insider Trading Summary Report was damaging, but for Retail it was our most up to date and quickest view of what was happening to our personal holdings. Seems to be quite unfortunate that this piece of information is now missing.

Wednesday, August 30, 2017

About That Polypropylene Plant: A Call With $IPL Inter Pipeline Ltd.

Inter Pipeline $IPL is one of the longest held companies in my portfolio; during its Income Trust days of August 2009. Over the years the growing dividend has provided me with an excellent cash flow. One major development in late 2016 was the purchase of Williams Canada and their Natural Gas Liquids business. This acquisition also provided plans for a potential Propane Dehydrogenation (PDH) facility and a Polypropylene (PP) facility. The $3BN capital cost and development of a new line of business has been a big concern of mine and after IPL's last quarter call many questions came to mind (Read: Inter Pipeline's (IPPLF) CEO Christian Bayle on Q2 2017 Results - Earnings Call Transcript).

Questions:

- The need to "educate" others on the fee structure is concerning.
- Project appears to be much more likely to occur with nearly $455MM already spent on the project with a large equipment piece already ordered.
- 11 of 16 analysts had questions regarding the new projects in planning.
- What is up with all this interest in Polypropylene? Competing facilities planned by Pembina Pipeline and Tidewater Midstream and infrastructure.
- Is there a possibility of a Joint Venture to spread out the risk?

A few days ago I finally had an opportunity to speak with Inter Pipeline's investor relations. Here are notes from the conversation, which was not recorded and notes were hastily scribbled. I tried cleaning it up a bit, but to summarize I think the basic take away is:

The purpose of adding Polypropylene is to take Propane, a landlocked commodity that is currently oversupplied in Alberta, and hence, low priced; and converting it into a higher priced product that can be sold globally.
While I didn't drill down deeply into details the conversation gave me some more confidence with IPL's proposed plans.

Inter Pipeline has four business segments:
1) Oil transport
2) Natural Gas Liquids
3+4) Conventional and bulk liquid storage.


1) Oil Transport is the most stable segment.
- Most revenues: 55% EBITDA.
- Cost of service, no commodity risk.
- Upstream production, guarantees capacity.
- Typically 25 year contracts.
- $600mm/year stable.
- Strategy (crown jewel) with $3BN invested recently is Cold lake and Polaris. It was completed in 2015 with approvals for excess capacity.
- It is a play on oil sands, if the commodity price increases they can expand with reduced regulatory needs.
- Conventional oil in Saskatchewan is fee based.
- When Oil was at $20, throughput was 200k, now with oil higher they are at 208k.

3+4) Bulk storage, Europe. Counter cyclical segment. Storage can be used by clients for contango.
- 98/99% capacity usage.
- Little is actually used for contango storage.
- 15% remaining is operational flow of liquids.
- Liquids stored include things like vodka and vegetable oil.
- Growth through acquisitions.
- Most deal flow for this segment is in Europe.

2) Natural Gas Liquids
- 2004 straddle business bought from Williams.
- 2015 Off Gas business bought from Williams.
- Williams already invested $2.5BN. Unique to Alberta.
- Few upgraders available, which turn Bitumen into better products.
- Byproduct Off Gas is used as feed stock for other processes.
- Byproduct is liquids rich.
- Sent to extraction facility instead of burning.
- Valuable gases/liquids shipped: Ethelyne to Nova Chemicals.
- Oliphineics are not abundant and high demand. "Rare" and not natural.
- Examples: Polypropylene and Oil Sand condensates.
- Propane price is weak.

- $1.35bn acquisition of Williams signalled to the market a 95% commodity exposure.
- Same idea as 2004 when NGL extraction plants were acquired from Williams.
- Natural Gas Liquids to fund other line of business to reduce commodity exposure.
- Biggest growth will be Propane Dehydrogenation (PDH) / Polypropylene (PP) (PDH/PP).
- Alberta has an oversupply of propane by 125k. Projected oversupply is out to 2026.
- Solution is to take excess propane and convert it to high value product: "plastic pellets".
- By 2021 when facilities are constructed this will move the value chain downstream.
- Polypropylene is currently produced in the Gulf Coast (USA).
- Propane is land locked.
- Plastic pellets Polypropylene has less environmental concerns and it is easier to move plastic vs propane.
- Polypropylene opens a global market. It is the second largest polymer used worldwide.
- Examples: Carpets, bumpers, water bottles... Manufacturing industry.
- In the morning drinking his Starbucks he looked at his coffee cup lid and it is made of polypropylene.
- Polypropylene is more attractive than propane.
- The Williams management and staff have been retained from the acquisition, giving IPL their expertise.
- Forecast Global current demand of 66mm tonnes to 2021 of 83mm tonnes.
- North American current 8.1mm tonnes with target 2021 of 9.3mm tonnes.
- Midwest Chicago is the target market, but they can get it deeper: Gulf, Asia, etc
- Polypropylene is better than transporting propane at a Terminal.
- The Hold Up/what's taking time is: Commercial Negotiation.
- Try to derisk the project with contracts.


- What does it mean to "educate"? There are two types of clients:
1) Polypropylene consumer that will either Sell or use it for manufacturing.
2) Alberta propane producers are getting hit from low prices, facilities will offer them access.

- Education of the consumer "carpet maker" who normally expects to buy at spot and unhedged. IPL will be able to offer them long term contracts and the economics is good. The hang up is the 4 year construction period and then signing up for a 5-10 year contract.
- *All commercial factors, the Term is the sticking point. Value is proven by moving up the value chain.
- Making a normal agreement still takes a long time.
- Few periods where it has been a Win/Win. Hard to lock in a 5 year contract after 4 years.
- It is compelling for them to lock in and for IPL to be able to go forward. Mutually beneficial.
- Education is figuring out the framework.

- Investors buy IPL for stability. Acquisitions have been for stability.
- Sufficient take or pay contract.
- Natural Gas Liquid value chain. We are doing as before.
- * 525k tonnes of Polypropylene capacity.
- They will create Polypropylene contracts with some buffer (keep some for themselves to sell) that keeps some commodity exposure.
- The buffer allows them to stay as an active participant in market. Engaged in knowing the commodity market. aka Keeping a finger on the pulse.
- Canada is not a big user, but Canada still imports 500k tonnes.
- Target market for Polypropylene is mostly USA and probably some Canada.
- Pembina Pipelines (PPL) will be building same size +500k, but IPL doesn't think it will over saturate the market. "We would build a second facility if PPL didn't.|"
- 15% growth in north America. 25% growth globally.
- Polypropylene production is unique to Canada, but the technology and building have been done before in the Gulf.
- IPL not worried about less propane available with AltaGas's (ALA) Ridley Island Propane Export Terminal.
- IPL has already spent more than PPL and has bid for components for construction. Getting a fixed quote shows how far we are in the planning.
- Literally want the right contracts for the facility.

- * Comparing with Canexus is not relevant as they are a different sized company with different access to capital, financing, and credit rates.

- IPL's share weakness and lack of transparency is due to the Final Investment Decision (FID).
- IPL's Off Gas business is still being digested and Analysts are still trying to figure out this segment. - Example: $40mm EBITDA in Q1 with IPL vs. $40mm in one year with Williams.
- FID completion will be a catalyst for IPL shares.
- Chris (CEO?) wouldn't do PDH/PP unless it was "good" for shareholders. IPL is investor focused.
- Important to keep in mind the dividend is not underpinned by Commodity Exposure.

- Partnering is not off the table, but it would be a good access to Capital.
- However a Joint Venture would be about more than money. IPL would want them to bring expertise and contracts.
- Example of IPL financial strength, 2013-2015, $3bn deal was done solo and this was when IPL was smaller. Now IPL is bigger and should be able to do it solo.
- Joint Ventures means more complex contracts for supply and product sales.
- IPL has a good track record, so why give up returns. We have experts.


- Financing would be targeting 50/50 debt and equity.
- Target Debt to Capitalization is 50-55%.
- Corridor Oil Sands system has $1.5/1.6 BN of Non-Recourse debt that is serviced by shippers.
- Q2 YTD 55% Debt to Total Capitalization. Debt Covenant allows for 65%.
- Organic project spending over number of months would be funded via the bank line, $1.5bn facility.
- Lumpy spending on the project (not all payments are upfront) means they can draw down their Credit Line then go to Debt market for 7 and 10 Year Issues to repay and then reuse the Credit Line.
- Equity not preferred as share price is down. "not keen on it".
- Currently at the top range of Debt to Capitalization.
- DRIP gives $25mm/month, $300mm/year. (Note: DRIP discount was removed August 2015; Williams acquisition was August 2016; Premium Dividend reinstated Oct 2016)
- DRIP would provide the company with $1.2bn over 4 years.
- Williams and Cold Lake acquisitions pushed Debt to Capitalization over 57%.
- DRIP brought the Debt to Capitalization back down. DRIP also provides flexibility as it is better than doing a bought deal and paying underwriter, fees, etc.

- Macro events always an issue.
- "Not everywhere on market that you can get a 7% yield. Attractive on the market."


Note: IPL has hit a 52 week low of $22.14 (Aug 30, 2017), much lower from the 52 Week High of $30.07. I have been averaging down my position and added more yesterday (Aug 30, 2017) based on the price and to an extent from the conversation with Inter Pipeline. The intention is to continue holding a core position and the excess will be sold if and when the price recovers.

Saturday, June 3, 2017

TSX Top Short Positions Update (May 15 + April 30) $TD $BNS reductions.

I was perusing the TMX site and checked on the Top TMX Short Position list that updates on the 15th and End of Month: https://www.tmxmoney.com/en/research/short_positions.html

As this is not something that I look at frequently my contextual read on it is hazy. However, it appears as if enormous short covering has been happening between April 30 and May 15 of 2017.

April 30 (Reflects April 17 - April 30) to May 15

Not sure what others may read from this as we don't have full info and timing, but here's what I see. Preceding the financial sell off was the Home Capital Group "debacle" that kicked off HCG's share price collapse around April 25. Again, I don't have short data for that period, but I'm guessing it has increased during that period for all financials.

April 30 to May 15 data shows the bear mauling? may have ended with a cover into weakness. TD and BNS short data shows that between April 17 (reflected as the period elapsed between the April 15 to April 30 update) and May 15 a major amount of shorts covered. Probably an expectation that the easy money has been made; at least for the time being depending on news flow.

Indeed as we went into the following week several events occurred.

* April 20 Ontario Wynne government unveiled more housing rules to cool down housing prices.

* April 27 Healthcare Of Ontario Pension Plan stepped in with the now infamous +20% interest $2 Billion line of credit. However, during this time things were very shaky as investors hung onto HCG's almost daily reports of deposit outflows. Fears of a housing collapse and HCG going for bankruptcy from their stealth bank run.

* May 9 HCG revealed a deal to sell $1.5 Billion in mortgages.

* May 10 some investors like CIBC and another Fund announced they have actually been increasing positions.

* May 12 reports were starting to show stabilization of HCG's deposits.

* May 24, Wednesday, the week after May 15, kicked off the Canadian bank earnings schedule.

I am interpreting this to mean the big boys that profited from the Canadian financials dropping got out of that trade in anticipation of improving HCG news flow and then bank earnings which could switch attention away onto more positives.

We will need to follow up with EoM May 31 data to see where things go, but I am guessing shorts continued covering as you will see in the June 2 share price.





  
  • May 15: 49,464,727 (of 1,847,198,000 outstanding shares = 2.6778% of shares shorted. Not sure about derivative short positions.
  • April 30: 61,783,555
  • Net Change: -12,318,828
  • % Change: -19.9386%
  • April 17 (Period for the April 30 update): $66.20
  • May 15 (Last Update): $63.67
  • June 2 (Friday Close): $64.84

June 2 you can see the dip.



  • May 15: 27,991,079 (of 1,201,865,000 outstanding shares = 2.3289% of shares shorted. Not sure about derivative short positions.)
  • April 30: 34,550,102
  • Net Change: -6,559,023
  • % Change: -18.984%
  • April 17 (Period for the April 30 update): $77.14
  • May 15 (Last Update): $75.73
  • June 2 (Friday Close): $76.68

June 2 you can see the dip.


Of interest with the TSX 60 ETF shorts were covered and the price remained steady, unlike TD+BNS, which could indicate overall strength in the index. However, after May 15 the price was taken lower and again this may be news dependent. A global event of sorts as US Indicies went down alongside.

iShares S&P/TSX 60 Index Fund (XIU-TSX):
  • May 15: 42,135,997
  • April 30: 58,335,479
  • Net Change: -16,199,482
  • % Change: -27.7695%
  • April 17 (Period for the April 30 update): $23.25
  • May 15 (Last Update): $23.26
  • June 2 (Friday Close): $22.84


Tuesday, May 30, 2017

$SVI.V StorageVault Canada Inc - Attended the Annual General Meeting (May 30, 2017)

My first Annual General Meeting (AGM) was several years ago for CML HealthCare (CLC). *Sigh* At least this time around it was for one of my big winners: StorageVault Canada Inc (TSX Venture Exchange: SVI). Admittedly, my knowledge of the self-storage industry is limited and maybe there's a superficial understanding of this self-storage company. My original interest and reasoning for buying SVI is because they are only Canadian publicly listed self-storage real estate company. There were good questions and answers at the AGM that helped bring some points together and gave me some additional understanding of the business.

I don't want to say this is advertising the stock, but by nature of posting these details it is inadvertently advertising a stock of mine and of which may be acquiring more. I will list out in point form what I picked up. Some numbers may not be accurate/misheard and the notes have not been reorganized to avoid potentially messing up the details.

Q: Who are the top players in Canada? (Answered by Steve)
- Main ones:
- StorageMart US company has 65 stores in Canada.
- Public Storage (Canada) 56 stores in Canada. Goal of building 1 and acquire 1 each year.
- Real Storage - Calgary, 31 stores. Used to be Mobile Home Manufacturer.
- Apple Self Storage 26 stores. Partnered with a US REIT.
- Maple Leaf Self Storage - Calgary/Vancouver. Family owned.

- No need to affiliate with US players.
- Also, REIT structure in the USA makes it harder for US REITs to own Canadian assets.

Q: $21 Million loss/Earnings per share loss? (Answered by Steve)
- These are accounting losses via depreciation.
- Storage business has a tax feature that allows for accelerated/increased depreciation, which quickly creates a tax shelter with Carry Forward Losses.
- When using shares to acquire a property IFRS accounting rule (#19?) applies. This registers the stock price difference between the acquisition announcement date vs the closure date. Example: $1.35 announce date vs $2.00 closure date. Record increased amount... ... ...  add Goodwill to balance sheet and increase write off. (Steve joked around a bit about accounting and also gave an example in the reverse if share price dropped instead of went up since announce/closure)

- Noted: Steve brought up $2.50 as an example number a couple times. Is this a theoretical issue price?

- Focus on Free Cash Flow / Funds From Operations

- Depreciation acceleration = increased tax shelter.

Q: How do you come up with the issue share price for the acquisitions? (Answered by Steve)
- Issuing shares "is a privilege, not a right."
- 3-4 month lag in deal closure due to approvals.
- No calculation. It is a deal by deal basis.
- Impact on purchase price due to tax considerations.
- Expect less use of stock and more use of cash <-- Due to increasing bargaining power.
- 20 years in storage business. Problem with acquirees is they are savvy and their accountants tell them of tax implications + Estate & Tax Planning.
- Distribution - they prefer to reinvest into company, but acquirees' tax plan/retire want cashflow.

- NOI increase 4-6%? tgt 6-10%? ???

- US vs Canada saturation: CBRE report currently 2.2 to 2.5 sq ft per capita. Typical is 4? sq ft per capita.
- Room for more, but tough to build in Canada.

- 85% of customers are within 5km radius. Supply not meeting demand.
- Population driven business.

- 2,500 to 3,000 stores in Canada? SVI 84-86 stores + Access Storage 50 stores = ~140 stores
- Largest 10 have 12%
- Attractive business due to: High Margin, 0 Bad Debt, and Low employee.

Q: How much is spent to acquire each customer? (Answered by Steve)
- Spend per customer: $70-80
- New customers cost more.
- Discounts, advertising, referrals, advertising signs, local events, Google.
- GOOG = 50-60% of spend "Google-flation"
- Customers usually expect to use services for 3-4 months. Usually 11 months? Their customers stay for 16 months?
- People also rarely visit their units.

- PODs business competes with moving companies (DIY).
- September 2016 became a "Vendor Member of Costco" meaning exclusive supplier of storage services for Costco members.
- Excess land allows them to store PODs.
- Biggest cost of PODs = land for storage with SVI.
- However, 50% of POD users end up storing it at home.

- Redevelopment/rezoning opportunities?
- 750,000 sq ft of expansion opportunity.
- BC expansion coming online... ? 40K
- Montreal 10K expansion in summer.
- Target 50k build out per year that is demand driven.

Q: How do you get your information? (Answered by Steve)
- Canadian Self Storage Association + US large owners group
- Bought stuff via "direct drive" they have never bought anything listed.
- (Info asymmetry = benefit them)
- Fill funnel for 10-15 years? (Does this mean they want to have a list of acquisitions for that period of time?)

Q: Debt maturities? (Answered by Iqbal)
- Renewals this year, some.
- Maturity over 5 years.
- Good reception from lenders for refinance.
- Major lenders are in this industry now compared to decades? ago.
- Default rate close to 0% industry-wide
- 2021-2022? staggered debt maturities

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

The 2K Club Is Now Open: $ENF Enbridge Income Fund Holdings Inc

Enbridge Income Fund Holdings Inc and Enbridge Inc released a $500,000,000 secondary share offering today at $33.15 a 3.5% discount to the previous day's trade of $34.51. At $33.15 ENF has a yield to cost of 6.193%. The offer closes April 18, 2017.

http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/enbridge-income-fund-holdings-inc-announces-05-billion-secondary-offering-common-shares-tsx-enf-2205637.htm

My portfolio already has a significant number of ENF shares 800 @ $30.3604 with a yield to cost of 6.7627%. The position provides a total yearly income of $1,642.56.

The price drop presented a compelling opportunity and led to a decision to overload my position though picking up 300 more shares at $33.29. Effectively, my share count is now 1,100 @ $31.1693 with a lower yield to cost of 6.5872%. However, the new position now provides a higher yearly income of $2,258.52.

Welcome to The 2K Club.

I will need to monitor as this add-on as it is completely funded with debt at 3.45%. The dividend covers the interest payments nicely plus some of the principle. If the shares increase enough then it will be an opportunity to lighten up. Utilising investment debt is a add-on strategy to my original dividend portfolio goal. My portfolio will forego Dividend Reinvestment and replace it with earlier and larger share purchases with the cash flow paying off the debts.

We're nearing the end of March and I will start working on my 50K Report for Q1 FY2017. Since Q4 FY2016 there have been interesting developments bringing me ever-so-slightly closer to the 50K goal.

Thursday, February 2, 2017

$BCE Q4 F2016: "dividend since the end of 2008 – a total increase of 97%"

BCE released their Q4 F2016 earnings today and rewarded shareholders with a +$0.14, +5.128% dividend increase from $2.73 to $2.87.
BCE common share dividend increasedToday's dividend announcement is BCE's 13th increase to its annual common share dividend since Q4 2008, representing a 97% increase. The BCE annualized common share dividend will increase 5.1%, or 14 cents per share, from $2.73 to $2.87 effective with BCE's Q1 2017 dividend payable on April 15, 2017 to shareholders of record at the close of business on March 15, 2017. This is BCE's 9th consecutive year of 5% or better dividend growth, while maintaining the dividend payout ratio(3) within the target policy range of 65% to 75% of free cash flow. The higher dividend for 2017 is fully supported by projected growth in free cash flow.
http://www.bce.ca/news-and-media/releases/show/BCE-reports-2016-Q4-and-full-year-results-announces-2017-financial-targets-Common-share-dividend-increased-5-1-to-2-87-per-year-1?page=1&month=&year=
Wow, since Q4 2008 the dividend increased by 97%! In hindsight, BCE continues to be a dividend machine. I decided to pull some numbers to see what this means for long term dividend investors.

The Q4 2008 dividend was declared on December 12, 2008 payable January 15, 2009 at $0.365/share, annualized $1.46. Let's take the closing price on the declaration date: $21.23. This means BCE offered a yield of 6.877%.

Taking the Q1 2017 dividend of $0.7175/share annualized to $2.87. We're looking at a yield to cost of 13.518%. That's a 13.518% cash-in-hand return per year without having to trade and without having to worry about price fluctuations.

Looking at it in another way; I took all the dividend payments since Q4 2008 until Q1 2017. One share of BCE at $21.23 was yielding 6.8771% and paid out $0.365 in Q4 2008. By the upcoming Q1 2017 that one share would yield 13.5186%, an increase, as BCE stated of 96.5741%.

Taking it even further, the chart at end of my post below shows how one share would have returned $18.8425 in cash, an 88.75% cash-in-hand return on the original principle of $21.23. This doesn't include the capital appreciation. Adding share price gains today's close was $57.44, a +$36.21 or 170.5605% share appreciation. Putting dividend and share appreciation together we hit 259.3146% returns. Not bad at all.

There are many other dividend stocks out there that have provided lucrative and passive returns. The risk is always there of share price declines due to a negative shift in the business and dividends are not guaranteed. With hindsight we can say BCE so far has been a successful dividend play.

Total Dividend $18.84250
Share Price $21.23000
Cash Return 88.75%

Dividend + Share Appreciation = $55.0525
Total Return = 259.3146%

There

Declaration Date Record Date Payment Date Dividend Annual Dividend Share Price Yield to Cost
2008-12-12 2008-12-23 2009-01-15 $0.36500 $1.46000 $21.23 6.8771%
2009-02-10 2009-03-16 2009-04-15 $0.38500 $1.54000 $21.23 7.2539%
2009-05-06 2009-06-15 2009-07-15 $0.38500 $1.54000 $21.23 7.2539%
2009-08-05 2009-09-15 2009-10-15 $0.40500 $1.62000 $21.23 7.6307%
2009-11-11 2009-12-15 2010-01-15 $0.40500 $1.62000 $21.23 7.6307%
2010-02-03 2010-03-15 2010-04-15 $0.43500 $1.74000 $21.23 8.1959%
2010-05-05 2010-06-15 2010-07-15 $0.43500 $1.74000 $21.23 8.1959%
2010-08-04 2010-09-15 2010-10-15 $0.45750 $1.83000 $21.23 8.6199%
2010-12-09 2010-12-15 2011-01-15 $0.45750 $1.83000 $21.23 8.6199%
2011-02-09 2011-03-15 2011-04-15 $0.49250 $1.97000 $21.23 9.2793%
2011-05-11 2011-06-15 2011-07-15 $0.51750 $2.07000 $21.23 9.7504%
2011-08-03 2011-09-15 2011-10-15 $0.51750 $2.07000 $21.23 9.7504%
2011-11-02 2011-12-15 2012-01-15 $0.51750 $2.07000 $21.23 9.7504%
2012-02-08 2012-03-15 2012-04-15 $0.54250 $2.17000 $21.23 10.2214%
2012-05-03 2012-06-15 2012-07-15 $0.54250 $2.17000 $21.23 10.2214%
2012-08-07 2012-09-14 2012-10-15 $0.56750 $2.27000 $21.23 10.6924%
2012-10-31 2012-12-14 2013-01-15 $0.56750 $2.27000 $21.23 10.6924%
2013-02-06 2013-03-15 2013-04-15 $0.58250 $2.33000 $21.23 10.9750%
2013-05-08 2013-06-14 2013-07-15 $0.58250 $2.33000 $21.23 10.9750%
2013-08-07 2013-09-16 2013-10-15 $0.58250 $2.33000 $21.23 10.9750%
2013-11-06 2013-12-16 2014-01-15 $0.58250 $2.33000 $21.23 10.9750%
2014-02-05 2014-03-14 2014-04-15 $0.61750 $2.47000 $21.23 11.6345%
2014-05-05 2014-06-16 2014-07-15 $0.61750 $2.47000 $21.23 11.6345%
2014-08-06 2014-09-15 2014-10-15 $0.61750 $2.47000 $21.23 11.6345%
2014-11-05 2014-12-15 2015-01-15 $0.61750 $2.47000 $21.23 11.6345%
2015-02-04 2015-03-16 2015-04-15 $0.65000 $2.60000 $21.23 12.2468%
2015-04-29 2015-06-15 2015-07-15 $0.65000 $2.60000 $21.23 12.2468%
2015-08-05 2015-09-15 2015-10-15 $0.65000 $2.60000 $21.23 12.2468%
2015-11-04 2015-12-15 2016-01-15 $0.65000 $2.60000 $21.23 12.2468%
2016-02-03 2016-03-15 2016-04-15 $0.68250 $2.73000 $21.23 12.8592%
2016-04-27 2016-06-15 2016-07-15 $0.68250 $2.73000 $21.23 12.8592%
2016-08-03 2016-09-15 2016-10-15 $0.68250 $2.73000 $21.23 12.8592%
2016-11-02 2016-12-15 2017-01-15 $0.68250 $2.73000 $21.23 12.8592%
2017-02-01 2017-03-15 2017-04-15 $0.71750 $2.87000 $21.23 13.5186%